The religious dimension of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement by Ng, Nancy & Fulda, Andreas
The Religious Dimension of Hong
Kong’s Umbrella Movement
Nancy Ng and Andreas Fulda
[The Umbrella Revolution] is a movement without a clear leader, one in
which crowds of largely young people are organizing themselves and act-
ing on their own, overtaking months of planning by veterans of the city’s
pro-democracy camp.1
The party-state is concerned by the fact that Protestants draw their moral
compass from a transnationalized source outside its control. Prominent
Christian involvement in Hong Kong’s 2014 Umbrella Movement, just
across the border from the mainland, serves to exacerbate this sense of
nervousness.2
The preceding statements by Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy
and by Phil Entwistle are indicative of the highly diverging view-
points about the organizational nature of Hong Kong’s Occupy
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Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) civil disobedience campaign,
also known as the Umbrella Movement (UM). While Buckley and
Ramzy described the OCLP/UM as secular and leaderless, Entwis-
tle has pointed out that Christian leaders actually played a signifi-
cant role in it. We agree that the aims of the movement were
indeed secular, for its key demands included both universal suf-
frage for electing Hong Kong’s chief executive and constitutional
reform aimed at making the territory’s parliament, the Legislative
Council (LegCo), more representative. At the same time, the
OCLP/UM’s most important leaders were religious people whose
justifications for direct political action had religious origins. De-
spite differences among the various competing Christian religious
groups—Catholic, Protestant, and Methodist—a significant
ecumenical alliance of Hong Kong Christians supported the
OCLP/UM. The movement thus had a religious dimension that
needs to be acknowledged.
The OCLP was the brainchild of a Christian professor of law at
Hong Kong University, Benny Tai Yiu-ting. On January 16, 2013,
Tai wrote an article in the Hong Kong Economic Journal titled
“The Most Destructive Weapon of Civil Disobedience,”3 making
the case that the Hong Kong government should be pressured to
allow the free and fair election of Hong Kong’s chief executive in
2017. He declared that an “era of civil disobedience” had begun
and called on the people of Hong Kong to occupy the financial
hub, Central, for three days during the public holidays from
October 1-3, 2014. During this period, Tai suggested to block all
the main roads leading to Central, to disrupt and paralyze the
flow of traffic, and to demand genuine universal suffrage from
Beijing. Tai’s original plan was thwarted when Joshua Wong, an-
other young Christian activist-cum-protest-leader, led 1,200 stu-
dents to join a rally on September 26, 2014, and to occupy the
Hong Kong LegCo compound.4 This was the Hong Kong students’
way to protest the August 31, 2014, ruling by the Chinese gov-
ernment’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee to
allow only candidates with pro-Beijing views to stand for the
2017 election of the chief executive. Wong and other student
leaders were arrested, but numerous others remained. Anxious
about their well-being, several OCLP leaders and tens of thou-
sands of people wishing to express their solidarity with the
3. B. Tai, “The Most Destructive Weapon of Civil Disobedience: Occupy Central
with Love and Peace,” Hong Kong Economic Journal, January 16, 2013, http://
www1.hkej.com//dailynews/article/id/654855/公民抗命的最大殺傷力武器.
4. Anonymous, “Christians Fight against Communism as Hong Kong Protests
Continue,” Catholic Online, September 29, 2014, http://www.catholic.org/news/
international/asia/story.php?id¼57074.
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students joined the movement either as spectators or partici-
pants. This led Tai to declare his support for the student protest-
ers and to launch the OCLP earlier than originally planned. The
police responded to the sudden swell of people by firing tear gas
and pepper spray on them, even though they were demonstrat-
ing peacefully. Fearing a repeat of the 1989 crackdown in Tianan-
men Square, the protesters wore facemasks and brought
umbrellas with which to fend off the police’s tear gas and pepper
spray. The OCLP thus evolved into the seventy-nine-day UM,
which lasted from September 26 to December 15, 2014. Edmund
W. Cheng and Wai-yin Chan have described the OCLP as a “pro-
democracy civil disobedience campaign lacking a social base,”
a “staged, temporary civil disobedience action [which]
was substituted by a spontaneous, resilient occupation”
by the UM.5 Attempting to establish whether or not the OCLP/UM
had a religious dimension is the conundrum at the heart of this
essay. More specifically, our question is whether or not the
OCLP/UM lacked the “ability to articulate the reasons for the
demonstrations”6 and thus had only “the power of its own
efforts to sustain it?”7 To solve this riddle, we examine the roles
of the church in Hong Kong in general and of Christian leaders in
particular. There was a strong presence of Protestant leaders in
the Hong Kong movement, including Benny Tai, Joshua Wong,
and the Reverend Chu Yiu Ming, the minister of the Chai Wan
Baptist Church. Catholic firebrands such as Cardinal Zen, who is
an outspoken critic of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
joined these Protestant leaders. Other Catholic OCLP/UM sup-
porters included Martin Lee, founder of the Hong Kong Demo-
cratic Party; Anson Chan, former chief secretary in the British
colonial government; and Jimmy Lai, the well-known pro-democ-
racy activist and owner of the media organization Next Digital.
Even the state-run mainland Chinese newspapers acknowledged
these Catholic figures and dubbed them the “four troublesome
gangsters of Hong Kong.”8 In addition, many pastors, leaders,
and Christians of other denominations made their churches
available for prayer and for use as sites for the provision of food,
5. Edmund W. Cheng and Wai-Yin Chan, “Explaining Spontaneous Occupation:
Antecedents, Contingencies and Spaces in the Umbrella Movement,” Social Move-
ment Studies 16, no. 2 (2017): 222-39.
6. Byron Williams, “Leaderless Movements are Impossible to Maintain,” HuffPost,
December 11, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/byron-williams/leaderless-
movements-are_b_6308064.html.
7. Ibid.
8. Catholic Online, 2014. “Christians Fight against Communism as Hong Kong
Protest Continues by Catholic Online (News Consortium).”
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water, and rest. One of the most notable non-Christian OCLP co-
founders, Professor Chan Kin Man, has been credited with add-
ing to the political manifesto the faith-inspired terms love and
peace, which Shun-hing Chan has described as “core values of
Christianity.”9
We believe that there is a gap in the literature on the subject of
changing state-church relations in Hong Kong, which our research
fills. To complete our investigation, we traveled in the spring of
2015 to Hong Kong, where we interviewed pastors and Christian
leaders who had taken part in the OCLP/UM, and met legislators,
professors, students, and locals who had either supported or op-
posed the OCLP/UM.
In our study of the role of Christians in the OCLP/UM, we used em-
pirical sources, including interviews, news reports, and archival
materials, in the hope that they would cast light on why Christian
leaders were at the forefront of the movement. Our portrayals of
OCLP/UM leaders are informed by in-depth interviews with two
Christian leaders in particular, Cardinal Zen and Benny Tai. We also
relied on publicly available secondary sources, such as published
interviews with a third protagonist, Joshua Wong, as well as media
reports and academic publications on OCLP/UM.
We situated the OCLP/UM in the global context of Christian-led
social and political movements. We then analyzed state-church rela-
tions in Hong Kong since the end of the Second World War. Thereaf-
ter, we reviewed patterns of political participation among Hong
Kong Christians during three historical phases: 1945 to 1984, 1984
to 1997, and 1997 to 2017. This historical review reveals an evolu-
tion in Christian political activism in Hong Kong from what we call
“institutional channeling” prior to the Hong Kong handover to
China, to “political participation” and “direct political action” since
1997. We examine the specific roles, theological justifications, and
strategies of three different generations of influential Christian
leaders in the OCLP/UM represented, in turn, by Cardinal Zen,
Benny Tai, and Joshua Wong. We conclude the study with our reflec-
tions on the historical significance of OCLP/UM in Hong Kong’s on-
going struggle for democratic self-government.
The Role of Religion in Social Movements
Christianity has been at the heart of many social movements, in-
cluding the African-American Civil Rights Movement in the United
States, South Africa’s Anti-Apartheid Movement, Solidarity in
9. Shun-hing Chan, “The Protestant Community and the Umbrella Movement in
Hong Kong,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 16, no. 3 (2015): 385.
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Poland, and Cardinal Sin’s ousting of the corrupt president of the
Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, in the 1980s. The liberating role of
the Catholic Church in acting against perceived social ills, eco-
nomic disparities, and poverty fueled parts of the third wave of
democratization in several Latin American and Southeast Asian
countries. The church has played an important role in raising civic
consciousness and encouraging political participation by provid-
ing physical space and moral support to democracy movements.
A case in point is the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, which sup-
ported the opposition Dangwai Movement in the 1970s and
1980s.10
Christian Smith has lamented that “religion’s important contri-
butions to social movements remain conspicuously under-ex-
plored—arguably virtually ignored—in the academic literature on
social movements.”11 This tendency to neglect the power of faith
has something to do with the historical development of the disci-
plines of social and political science. As the twentieth century
progressed, secularization theory came to the fore because of the
influences of figures such as Karl Marx and Auguste Comte, who
predicted the decline and eventual disappearance of religion.
Sociologists such as Bryan Wilson,12 Peter Berger,13 and David
Martin14 all subscribed to this view. In the early 1990s, more and
more scholars began to see the need to account for “cultural, ex-
pressive ideological, emotional and symbolic aspects of collective
actions”15 rather than merely to identify the rational, political,
and instrumental aspects of social movements. Durkheimian the-
ory nonetheless acknowledges the role of religion in reminding
people of their shared identity, in strengthening interpersonal
relationships, and in contributing to group solidarity and a uni-
fied moral community of purpose.16 Bert Klandermans and Sid-
ney Tarrow argue that there may be too much stress placed on
what they call the four “core” movements of peace, women’s
rights, students, and environment, which have taken precedence
10. Dafydd Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, Routledge Research on
Taiwan Series (London: Routledge, 2012), 175-76.
11. Christian Smith, Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social-Movement
Activism (London: Routledge, 1996), 2.
12. Bryan Wilson, Religion in Secular Society (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1996).
13. Peter Berger, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic
Books, 1976).
14. David Martin, “Notes for a General Theory of Secularisation,” European Jour-
nal of Sociology 10, no. 2 (1969): 192-201.
15. A. D. Morris and C. McClurg Mueller, eds., Frontiers in Social Movement The-
ory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
16. Kenneth J. Neubeck and Davita Silfen Glasberg, Sociology: Diversity, Conflict,
and Change (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005).
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over all other social movements worth mentioning, including reli-
gion.17 Tomas Mac Sheoin’s review of social movement journals
supports this finding by confirming that religious movements
have indeed been under-researched.18
Recent scholarship by Cheng and Chan is a case in point.19 In
their discussion of the historical antecedents of the OCLP/UM,
they do not address the movement’s religious dimension and fo-
cus instead on the protesters’ experiences of post-colonial Hong
Kong. In terms of social movement leaders, Cheng and Chan sin-
gled out Joshua Wong and the student activist group he led, called
Scholarism, as a crucial driving force behind the UM. A key finding
of their research is that once the UM was under way, “leaders …
considered negotiating with local government and finding ways to
retreat, but they lacked the legitimacy and capacity to call protest-
ers off the streets.”20 We concur with Cheng and Chan that lead-
ing participants in the OCLP/UM were unable to steer its course
and could not control its outcome. What appears to be missing
from their analysis, however, is a more historically informed dis-
cussion of the historical precursors and individual motivations
among high-profile leaders to start the movement in the first
place. This research thus fills a gap in scholarship on the OCLP/
UM by examining how changing church-state relations set the
stage for the movement in 2014. It reveals why and how Christian
leaders in particular helped trigger the social movement.
Cooptation of Christian Churches through
Institutional Channeling: 1945 to 1982
Hong Kong’s OCLP/UM might be considered a prime example of a
social movement in which various Christian leaders and their con-
gregations promoted the democratic process through civil disobe-
dience. To understand the particular case of Hong Kong’s OCLP/
UM better, state-church relations need to be examined from a his-
torical perspective, since in Hong Kong they followed neither the
separation model of Western democratic countries nor the state-
dominated model of the Soviet Union and other totalitarian
17. Bert Klandermans and Sidney Tarrow, “Mobilization into Social Movements:
Synthesizing European and American Approaches,” in From Structure to Action:
Comparing Social Movement Research, ed. B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi, and S. Tar-
row (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988), 17-23.
18. Tomas Mac Sheoin, “The World According to Social Movement Journals:
A Preliminary Mapping,” Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements 8,
no. 1 (2016): 189-90.
19. Cheng and Chan, “Explaining Spontaneous Occupation.”
20. Ibid., 14.
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countries. Until 1997, Hong Kong was a British colony. In the late
1980s, the British government introduced limited democracy. Due
to strong interventions from Beijing, it stopped short of introduc-
ing universal suffrage prior to the handover in 1997. British colo-
nial rule gradually improved the political opportunity structures
for Christian leaders by allowing them to move from institutional
channeling to political participation and eventually to direct political
action. Understanding this historical development is crucial to any
critical analysis of the reach and significance of the OCLP/UM.
During the colonial period, particularly after the Second World
War, the church played a subordinate political role in what John
D. McCarthy, David W. Britt, and Mark Wolfson refer to as “institu-
tional channeling.”21 Throughout this period, the colonial govern-
ment used the church as a political tool to curb the infiltration of
communists, British colonial administrators were convinced that
only Christianity could resist the subversive elements of Commu-
nism, whereas non-religious or secular primary education would
produce an atheistic proletariat. 22 The colonial government thus
favored Christian churches as agents that might curb the activi-
ties of communists and resist communist infiltration by having
the Roman Catholic Church enlarge its schoolwork; this was unan-
imously accepted. This indirect approach took the form of a con-
tractual system.23
As a client of the colonial government, the Roman Catholic
Church became an indirect opponent of the CCP. Through institu-
tional channeling, it was given authority and funding to provide
education and social services.24 In 1966, Christian political activ-
ism led to the establishment of a Hong Kong Christian Industrial
Committee to tackle labor issues. The HCIC aimed to replace the
labor unions established by pro-China organizations. An empha-
sis on limited social welfare provisions, mostly provided by Other
denominational organizations, such as the Methodist Committee
for Overseas Relief and the Presbyterian Mandarin Casework Cen-
ter, worked on behalf of the colonial government and helped pac-
ify the workforce by providing limited social welfare. Christian
churches also provided food and clothing and, eventually,
21. John D. McCarthy, David W. Britt, and Mark Wolfson, “The Institutional
Channeling of Social Movements by the State in the United States,” Research in
Social Movements, Conflict and Change 14 (1991): 45-76.
22. Steve Tsang, ed., A Documentary History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University Press, 1995), 85.
23. Beatrice Leung and Shun-hing Chan, Changing Church and State Relations in
Hong Kong, 1950–2000 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 26-28.
24. Beatrice Leung, “Church–State Relations in the Decolonisation Period: Hong
Kong and Macau,” Religion, State and Society 26, no. 1 (1998): 17-30.
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counseling services, legal aid, social welfare, and family guid-
ance.25 The Catholic and Anglican churches were the main bodies
involved in offering education and social services. Vincent Goos-
saert and David A. Palmer have pointed out that “by 1996, Chris-
tian churches operated half of Hong Kong’s 1,354 primary and
secondary schools.”26 The British colonial government contracted
out 25 percent of Hong Kong’s social services to Christian
churches27 and, by the 1990s, a quarter of all Hong Kong students
were being educated in Catholic schools. Wah Yan College, for in-
stance, produced many elites, including the former chief execu-
tive Donald Tsang Yam Kuen. The former chief secretary Anson
Chen, Martin Lee, and many other prominent figures were also
graduates of Catholic schools.28
From Institutional Channeling to Political
Participation, 1984-1997
Institutional channeling also meant that as a client of the colonial
government, the church partly lost its power to criticize the gov-
ernment when things went wrong. This dependency on the colo-
nial government started to change once it became evident that
after 1997 Hong Kong would come under China’s sovereignty.
The subsequent period of political transition after 1997 gradually
allowed Catholic churches to expand their organizational auton-
omy. Former governor Chris Patten observed that “at the heart of
the life of this very Chinese city, the Catholic Church—missionar-
ies and locals, with so many Chinese priests and nuns today—con-
tributes to public life and social service out of all proportion to its
numbers.”29 The Protestant and evangelical churches, on the
other hand, were less integrated into the colonial system. The
evangelical churches generally steered clear of building rapport
with the colonial government, instead focusing solely on their
own evangelistic programs. In terms of their stance towards civil
25. Ibid., 40-43.
26. Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern
China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 350.
27. Johannes M. M. Chan, “Human Rights: From One Era to Another,” in The
Other Hong Kong Report 1997, ed. Joseph Y. S. Cheng (Hong Kong: Chinese Uni-
versity Press, 1997), 137-67.
28. Beatrice Leung, “The Catholic Church in Post-1997 Hong Kong: Dilemma in
Church-State Relations,” in China and Christianity: Burdened Past, Hopeful Fu-
ture, ed. Stephen Uhalley Jr. and Xiaoxin Wu (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001),
286.
29. Christopher Patten, East and West: China, Power, and the Future of Asia (New
York: Random House, 1998), 136.
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disobedience, not all churches formally agreed with the goals and
activities of the OCLP/UM. L. Y. Kung has argued,
[the] scene is more complicated in Protestant churches. Before the police
used tear gas on September 28, most Protestant churches in Hong Kong
were quiet on the issue of universal suffrage, except for the Methodist
Church and a few indigenous churches. Even though some Protestant
churches have issued pastoral letters in response to Occupy Central,
their main concern was to call for the respect of the differences on Oc-
cupy Central among believers; they did not address the core concern of
Occupy Central, which was universal suffrage. After September 28 and
the opening of the Umbrella Movement, more Protestant churches con-
demned the excessive use of force by the police, and urged the govern-
ment to have an honest dialogue with the protesters in order to solve the
existing political predicament. Moreover, a few Protestant churches
opened their premises as shelter for protesters during the period of oc-
cupation. Despite this, churches making such kinds of public statements
are still in the minority.30
Some conservative Protestant groups, such as the Evangelical Free
Church of China and the Hong Kong Anglican Church, opposed
the movement. Other progressive Protestant groups, such as the
Hong Kong Christian Council, the Hong Kong Methodist Church,
and the Hong Kong Renewal Movement/Protestants in Support of
Constitutional Reform, led by Rev. Wu Chi-wai, came out in sup-
port.31 Despite these formal divisions, Reverend Wu has “esti-
mated that more than half of the roughly 1,400 Protestant
churches in Hong Kong organized ad hoc groups to help the
movement.”32 Protestant churches therefore played an important
informal role in facilitating the OCLP/UM.
Prior to the 1997 handover, Gov. Chris Patten gradually ex-
panded the LegCo’s power to give the people of Hong Kong a pro-
democratic voice. The Catholic Church took this as encourage-
ment to train leaders for the political careers. And middle-class
professionals, who were mainly Catholics and Protestants, en-
dorsed this teaching initiative. The Catholic Church saw training
Christian leaders as a priority, so it set up the Catholic Institute
for Religion and Society, which aimed to prepare people for socio-
30. Lap Yan Kung, “The Umbrella Movement and Kairos: The Church’s Theologi-
cal Encounter with a Political Movement,” in Theological Reflections on the Hong
Kong Umbrella Movement, ed. Justin K. H. Tse and Jonathan Y. Tan (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 113.
31. Shun-hing Chan, “The Protestant Community and the Umbrella Movement,”
380-95.
32. Rose Wu, “Radical Inclusion in the Umbrella Movement: Interstitial Integrity
and the New Pentecostal Rebirth of Hong Kong,” in Theological Reflections on the
Hong Kong Umbrella Movement, ed. Justin K. H. Tse and Jonathan Y. Tan (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 94.
The Religious Dimension of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement
9
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jcs/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jcs/csx053/4157178/The-Religious-Dimension-of-Hong-Kong-s-Umbrella
by University of Nottingham user
on 02 October 2017
political participation.33 As a result, Catholic political participa-
tion surged during Legislative Council elections, with a large ma-
jority of Catholics voting in support of democracy at a ratio of
86.6 (Catholic votes) to 39.1 (public votes) in 1991.34 By gradually
liberalizing Hong Kong’s political institutions, the British colonial
government had opened up new venues for political participation
and political contestation. As the 1997 return of Hong Kong drew
near, many Christians became either directly involved as political
party members, such as the pro-democrats, or independent
non-party affiliated members of the LegCo. J. K. H. Tse has ar-
gued that “the participation of individual Catholics and Protes-
tants may have only occurred at the personal (as opposed to
institutional) level.”35 Since legislators are not required to dis-
close their religious affiliations, it is difficult to ascertain the ex-
act percentage of Christian LegCo members at any given point in
time. During the 2016 oath-taking ceremony, however, nineteen
out of seventy LegCo members referred to the New Testament
(Webb-site Reports 2016). Even assuming that only a quarter of
the LegCo members are Christians (and the fraction may be con-
siderably larger), Christian representation on the council is dis-
proportionate to the Christian population of Hong Kong.
Official accounts suggest that 10 percent of Hong Kong’s citi-
zens identify as Christians, whereas academic studies have sug-
gested that up to 20 percent of Hong Kong’s citizens may
identify as Christians.36 Such findings suggest that politicians
of Christian faith are well represented in Hong Kong’s current
legislature.
The Christian Churches’ Political Involvement from
1997 Onwards
During the period of Hong Kong’s decolonization after 1997,
Christian churches, especially the Catholic Church, saw the CCP’s
ideology of dialectic materialism as a threat to religious freedom
in Hong Kong. The Catholic Church found itself in a politically
33. Leung, “Church-State Relations,” 20.
34. Beatrice Leung, “Political Participation of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong
SAR,” in New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, ed. Joseph Y. S.
Cheng (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014), 305.
35. Justin K. H. Tse, “Epilogue: Conscientization in the Aftermath of Occupying
Hong Kong,” in Theological Reflections on the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement,
ed. Justin K. H. Tse and Jonathan Y. Tan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016),
37.
36. June Cheng, “How Many Christians Live in Hong Kong?,” WORLD, October
30, 2014, https://world.wng.org/2014/10/how_many_christians_live_in_hong_
kong.
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awkward position. It had to balance its allegiances to its Hong
Kong constituents while at the same time manage an increasingly
difficult relationship with the CCP. In the words of Leung, “the
Hong Kong Catholic Church had a dual role to play: the bridge-
building church for the revival of the Chinese Church, a mission
given to them by the Vatican, and the role of a local church to deal
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) gov-
ernment.”37 Again and again, Beijing reminded Hong Kong citi-
zens that, after the handover in 1997, they should cooperate with
the HKSAR government and refrain from building alliances with
Catholics residing in mainland China.38 The Catholic Church had
greatly benefitted from the contractual system under colonial
rule, but that system had become “a system of elite consultation
and political absorption of the masses.”39 From the point of view
of policymakers in Beijing, Christianity was and is a remnant of
the historical past of humiliation at the hands of the British and
thus an aspect of cultural imperialism that needs to be
expunged.40
Christian civil-society actors started to feel the pinch of decolo-
nization after the handover in 1997. The introduction of the Edu-
cation (Amendment) Ordinance by the HKSAR government in
2004 required all schools to establish an Incorporated Manage-
ment Committee (IMC), with 40 percent of the board members
from a non-sponsoring body, by 2010. Cardinal Joseph Zen, who
headed the Diocese of Hong Kong and who oversaw Hong Kong
Catholic-run schools, fiercely opposed the reform. He wrote long
letters and went on a hunger strike for days on end. Eventually
the reform was rejected, but only temporarily. If the ordinance
had passed at that time, it would have significantly reduced the
influence of faith-based groups in the management of Hong
Kong’s schools.
Such encroachments on the privileges of Christian civil-society
actors coincided with the Chinese central government’s attempt
to introduce an anti-subversion law in 2003 by invoking Article 23
of Hong Kong’s Basic Law. Because this proposed anti-subversion
law would have rendered any criticism of either the Hong Kong or
37. Leung, “The Catholic Church in Post-1997 Hong Kong,” 254.
38. Beatrice Leung, Camoes Tam, and Marcus Chu, “The Catholic Role in Hong
Kong SAR’s Governance: Past and Present,” in The Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region in its First Decade, ed. Joseph Y. S. Cheng (Hong Kong: University
of Hong Kong Press, 2009), 864-65.
39. L. Butenhoff, Social Movements and Political Reform in Hong Kong (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1999), 1, 83-86.
40. Leung and Chan, Changing Church and State Relations.
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central government tantamount to undermining the power and
authority of the Chinese party-state, it served to unite the differ-
ent Christian camps. A prime example of this unification was the
ecumenical prayer meeting led by Cardinal Zen and Reverend Chu
Yiu Ming prior to the historic demonstration of 500,000 people
against the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill based on
Article 23 of the Basic Law on July 1, 2003. Zen and Chu feared
that, once Article 23’s anti-subversion law was passed, religious
liberty would be constrained. They defended their actions by stat-
ing that legislation would undermine the “one country two sys-
tems” policy and lead to the erosion of human rights.41 Catholic
and progressive Protestant groups then formed a new alliance,
the Civil Human Rights Front, and started to organize collective
action further, notably through holding prayer meetings and by
lending support to local social movements. Recurring conflicts
with the HKSAR government since 1997 have politicized the role
of the Catholic Church and turned it from an indirect to a direct
opponent of the CCP.
Roles and Strategies of Influential Christian Leaders
in the OCLP/UM
Two of the three protagonists in this study played an important
political role prior to the OCLP/UM when, in response to the gov-
ernment’s plan to introduce a “National Patriotic Curriculum” in
2010,42 Cardinal Zen petitioned the court and sued the govern-
ment. The proposed new curriculum was widely perceived as an
attempt to brainwash young people in Hong Kong to love their
mother country China and, more importantly, to support the CCP.
In fact, it caused such controversy that students and parents pro-
tested against it. Joshua Wong, with his now disbanded student
group, Scholarism, and the Hong Kong Students’ Federation
scored a huge victory by mobilizing tens of thousands of students
and citizens in defiance of the new law, which forced the HKSAR
government to abandon its plans.
In hindsight, one could see the successful student-led protest
movement of 2010 as a rehearsal for the Umbrella Movement of
2014. Carsten Vala believed that the two Christian leaders subse-
quently became involved in the OCLP/UM because they feared in-
creasing marginalization: “The pushback here is [partly] the fear
that what happens in China will someday happen in Hong Kong
41. Leung, “Political Participation of the Catholic Church,” 294-95.
42. Ibid., 296-97.
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unless people speak out.”43 He argued that Christians were at the
forefront of leading the OCLP/UM because of the sensitive role
Christianity plays in Hong Kong society. In the words of Christian
Smith, “religion can help to keep everything in its place. But it can
also turn the world upside down.”44 We shall now look at the
Christian leaders’ theological justification for attempting to turn
the “world upside down” during the OCLP/UM.
Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-Kiun
One of the most senior protagonists during the OCLP/UM was Car-
dinal Joseph Zen. Born in Shanghai to Catholic parents in 1932, he
and his family fled to Hong Kong in 1948 where he received a Sale-
sian education and eventually graduated with a doctorate in theol-
ogy and philosophy from the Salesian Pontifical University in
Rome.45 Between 1973 and 1983, he worked for a few years as a
teacher, was promoted to principal, and later became Provincial Su-
perior of the entire Salesian order. He then worked in China as a
seminary lecturer until 1996. In the run-up to Hong Kong’s hand-
over to China, he was busy training Christian leaders in Shanghai. It
was only after 1996 that he returned to Hong Kong to resume his
appointment as coadjutor bishop of Hong Kong.46 When appointed
bishop on September 23, 2002, he began to adopt a more outspo-
ken approach to political issues. During the controversy around the
proposed anti-subversion laws in 2003, Zen led the members of his
diocese to voice their disagreement with the proposed law, which in
his view would violate civil rights.47
Zen believed that Hong Kong could truly live under the promised
“one country two systems” of the Basic Law. Zen’s hope was that
China would honor its promise to grant universal suffrage and de-
mocracy within a certain time. This is also why he chose to support
Tai’s idea of demanding universal suffrage through civil disobedi-
ence. With genuine universal suffrage, the Catholic Church would be
able to continue to play an important role in education and social
services. In his interview, Cardinal Zen reminisced about
43. Quoted in Jack Jenkins, “Why Christians are Helping Lead Hong Kong’s Pro-
Democracy Movement,” ThinkProgress, October 12, 2014, http://www.notey.
com/external/4493387/why-christians-are-helping-lead-hong-kong's-pro-democ
racy-movement-politics-national-security-terrorism-osama-bin-laden-isis-us-poli
tics-counterterror ism.html.
44. Smith, Disruptive Religion.
45. Joseph Zen Ze-Kiun Zen, Interview with Nancy Ng, March 31, 2015.
46. Annie Lam, “Cardinal Joseph Zen: ‘I am Just a Conscientious Teacher’– Life
after Turning 80,” Tripod 32 no. 166 (2012): 64-72, http://www.hsstudyc.org.hk/
en/tripod_en/en_tripod_166_09.html.
47. Ibid.
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institutional channeling during the colonial period and lamented
the strict government controls over the Catholic management of
schools in post-1997 Hong Kong. According to Zen:
After the 1997 handover, many things happened to Hong Kong, which
were damaging to the city. With the colonial regime we could not expect
to have democracy, but we enjoyed many freedoms. The UK is a demo-
cratic country and also, because it has a Christian tradition, as Catholics
we were OK—no problem with the government. Then, after the handover,
the problems started very soon.48
Though Tai was the originator of the OCLP, credit must also be
given to Zen, who was highly respected in the Catholic Church, as
well as by political parties and civic society groups. J. K. H. Tse
has pointed out that Cardinal Zen “has been a visible and critical
presence among the students.”49 Cardinal Zen strongly supported
the civic referendum organized by OCLP in June 2014 to gauge
public support for a direct election of Hong Kong’s chief execu-
tive. Cardinal Zen’s ultimate goal was thus to ensure that indepen-
dent candidates, who did not have to be vetted by Beijing, could
stand for the 2017 chief executive election. In our interview he
expressed his disappointment that the “Beijing White Paper [had]
told Hong Kong ‘Don’t ever think you have the power, we will only
give you what we want to give.’”50
Following the failure of OCLP/UM to achieve its ultimate goals,
Cardinal Zen reflected on the need to achieve greater unity and to
uphold the principle of non-violence:
I believe that without the Chinese government being willing to do some-
thing we have no chance, but at this moment we have to do something
and I can foresee people may use violence…. But I think we have to re-
mind the people that they made mistakes, but the purpose is important,
we did all these for a democratic society. If we don’t do something we
will become slaves of the dictatorial society. We have to rectify our mis-
take, which I think is disunion.51
Benny Tai Yiu Ting
As the initiator of OCLP, Benny Tai Yiu Ting played a leading role
in the Umbrella Movement. Born in 1964, he became a Christian at
48. Zen, “OCLP 2014 in HK.”
49. Tse, “The Umbrella Movement and Theology,” https://syndicate.network/
symposia/theology/the-umbrella-movement-and-theology/.
50. Ibid.
51. Zen, “OCLP 2014 in HK.”
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the age of twenty-three. He received his professional education at
Hong Kong University Law School. During his time at the univer-
sity, Tai was the assistant of Martin Lee, another Christian and
founding chairman of the Democratic Party.52 Tai went on to be-
come an associate professor of law at the University of Hong
Kong. In the interview, Tai acknowledged that he was inspired by
Martin Luther King Jr. When working with U.S. social scientists
Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, who advocated deliberative
democracy, Tai realized that he could put his faith into action by
lobbying for a pluralist Hong Kong.53 He was conscious of the role
that the Christian church has played in other democratizing
countries.
Tai maintained that political activism does not have to be
limited to the political arena and that churches must play an
active part in Hong Kong’s democratization. Chan quotes Tai
as stating in a media interview, “This is not a political activity.
For me, this is a religious activity in which I am preaching
therein.”54 Tai envisioned changing the conservative Christians’
view and actively engaging both Christians and non-Christians
in dialogue and political participation. In his Chinese-language
book, Occupy Central with Love and Peace, Tai presented the
OCLP as a “final push, or campaign of the last resort, for uni-
versal suffrage,” and argued that this final push entails deliber-
ative elements and acts of disobedience that directly challenge
the Beijing government.55 In Heidi Wang’s review of Tai’s
monograph, she explains that Tai sees five possible pathways
towards achieving democracy. One is via the traditional route
of demonstrations and debates with LegCo. The second, which
is represented by the 2010 resignation of pan-democratic law-
makers in five constituencies and the resulting by-elections, is
to have quasi referendums. The third and fourth strategies are
non-violent and violent civil disobedience, respectively. The
fifth and final one is to design a way to Hong Kong’s desire
for universal suffrage and Beijing’s unwillingness to copy the
52. T. Chong, “Academic Benny Tai Proves He Is Not All Talk and No Action,”
South China Morning Post, May 19, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/article/1515056/academic-benny-tai-proves-he-not-all-talk-and-no-action.
53. Alex Lo, “Benny Tai Is Not Evil, Just Misguided,” South China Morning Post,
August 14, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/
1296519/benny-tai-not-evil-just-misguided?page¼all&edition¼international.
54. Chan, “The Protestant Community and the Umbrella Movement in Hong
Kong,” 385.
55. Tai Yiu Ting, Zhanling Zhonghuan: Heping Kangzheng Xinzhanshi [Occupy
Central with Love and Peace] (Hong Kong: Enrich Publishing, 2013), 183.
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Western model to coexist, and thus allow the establishment to
remain in power.56
According to Wang, Tai justified his acts of civil disobedience as
legitimate on the grounds that people had exhausted all other le-
gal means and agreed with Martin Luther King Jr. that “justice too
long delayed is justice denied.”57 He also shared Gene Sharp’s
view that the function of negotiation is limited and even danger-
ous in the process of democratic transition.58 To achieve his polit-
ical vision and share his views and opinions, Tai is a frequent
contributor to Christian magazines and newspaper columns. His
idea of civil disobedience captured the public mood, for it entailed
putting deliberative democracy into action. Tai formed a task
force in order to organize the movement to implement electoral
reform, which the central government had promised in 2012. Af-
ter gathering positive responses from pan-democratic groups,
and with the support of Baptist pastor Rev. Chu Yiu Ming and so-
ciologist Chan Kin Man, Tai officially launched his OCLP platform
at a press conference at Kowloon Union Church on March 27,
2013.59 Holding the press conference at a church sent out a coded
message to potential Christian supporters that civil disobedience
was not just politically possible, but also theologically permissi-
ble. Press photos showed the three OCLP initiators standing in
front of a highly visible cross.60 He subsequently organized an
open-to-all deliberative meeting for political parties and civic-
society organizations in June 2013. Some seven hundred partici-
pants attended to set the agenda and engaged in deliberations
with specific groups, churches, social workers, students, and
many others. In May 2014, 2,500 people attended the third
planned meeting to consider all the proposals, of which three
were chosen to be included in the civil referendum. Tai’s intention
was to engage all levels of civil society to vote on one of the three
proposals. Of the 792,808 votes cast, the proposal by the Alliance
for True Democracy received 331,427 (42.1%), the proposal by
Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of Students 302,567
56. H. N. K. Wang, Book Review, Zhanling Zhonghuan: Heping Kangzheng Xinz-
hanshi [Occupy Central with Love and Peace], by Tai Yiu Ting (Hong Kong: Enrich
Publishing, 2013) in: Taiwan in Comparative Perspective 5 (July 2014): 168-72.
57. Ibid., 170.
58. Ibid.
59. Jermain T. M. Lam, “The Occupy Central Movement and Political Reform in
Hong Kong,” in New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, ed. Joseph Y.
S. Cheng (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014), 454.
60. Joshua But, “Occupy Central Hong Kong Supporters Ready to Block Traffic
and Go to Jail for Democracy,” South China Morning Post, March 28, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1201371/occupy-central-sup
porters-ready-block-traffic-and-go-jail-democracy.
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(38.4%), and the People Power’s proposal 81,558 (10.4%).61 During
this deliberative process, Tai went to more than one hundred
churches (including some with congregations of several thousand)
to explain the principles and practices of a civil disobedience move-
ment to leaders, pastors, and laity. His aim was to involve all the
different communities by engaging them in political discussions
about universal values such as democracy, equality, justice, and
righteousness, and to prepare them for real democracy through
participation in social movements. Tai also gave very clear guide-
lines on how to be non-violent in the event of police intervention
during protests. Surprisingly, Tai was not upset about the non-
conclusive results of the OCLP/UM. He maintained that the struggle
for universal suffrage should not be thought of as a singular event,
but as a series of strategic efforts to accumulate pressure on the
HKSAR and the Beijing government.
Joshua Wong Chi Fung
The third and final protagonist in this study is Joshua Wong Chi
Fung. This post-1997 progressive Christian is one of the youngest
political activists in Hong Kong. Called an “extremist” by China’s
state-run media, he was nominated as The Times Young Person of
the Year 2014, was tenth among the world’s fifty greatest leaders
in the Fortune 2015 list, and ranked among the ten most influen-
tial people by Agence France-Presse in 2014. Born in October
1996, he was only ten months old when Hong Kong was handed
back to China in 1997. At that point, Wong’s parents chose to re-
main in Hong Kong rather than emigrate. They raised Wong as a
Christian with strict Lutheran principles and, from an early age,
taught him to love and care for his neighbors. From his parents he
learned to oppose anti-gay and anti-discrimination laws.62
A typical Hong Kong teenager who has grown up in the social
media age, Wong is a knowledgeable activist who often contrib-
utes to opinion-editorials to international news outlets ranging
from Huffington Post, The New York Times, The Guardian, Time,
The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post. He also has his
own blog. He and his now-defunct Scholarism group gained prom-
inence in 2012 when he organized a 120,000-strong protest
61. Ma, Jazz, Frank Lee, and Robert Chung, Electronic Voting and Civil Referen-
dums in Hong Kong, 2014, https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/columns/col
umns156.html.
62. Malcolm Moore, “Portrait of Hong Kong’s 18-year-old protest leader,” The
Telegraph, December 11, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
asia/hongkong/11139904/ Portrait-of-Hong-Kongs-17-year-old-protest-leader.
html.
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against the Beijing proposal to implement the National Patriotic
Curriculum. His new student movement was more radical than
any movement before it and could employ different tools and
means to raise awareness, such as digital media, YouTube, and
street lectures. It also operated an online newspaper webpage.
This first protest attracted students, professors, and lecturers,
and provoked mass hunger strikes, which finally broke the re-
solve of the HKSAR, causing it to shelve the curriculum and give
schools the freedom to adopt any teaching guides and teaching
resources they deemed suitable.63
Wong belongs to the so-called Generation Y, which no longer
relies solely on being physically present at protests. Through digi-
tal activism, the “concept of digital democracy enables like-minded
people to connect with one another.”64 In fact, these young people
are now in a league of their own and can join in any social move-
ments, whether they are “democracy movements, cultural heritage
strikes for social justice, protection campaigns, [or] local farming
and reclamation community projects.”65 The more China attempts
to hold Hong Kong in a tight embrace, the more suffocated the
young people of Hong Kong feel, and so they try to break free.66 In-
stead of accepting their future, they have preferred to take a con-
frontational route. Their successful defeat of the projected
National Patriotic Curriculum in 2012 told Joshua Wong that he
and his supporters had a strong voice in Hong Kong politics.
In June 2014, Wong and his Scholarism group submitted a draft
for the reform of Hong Kong’s electoral procedures, which one-
third of the voters in the referendum accepted. In July, the group
staged a mass sit-in, at which 511 people were arrested. Then, in
September, Scholarism and the Hong Kong Students’ Federation
persuaded thirteen thousand people to boycott classes, and Hong
Kong’s largest teachers’ union circulated a petition that fully sup-
ported the students’ action. An announcement that student lead-
ers and the government had agreed on formal talks brought hope
to demonstrators that a resolution could be near. However, the
government made it known that the protesters’ core demands
(full universal suffrage for Hong Kong and the resignation of the
chief executive) would not be discussed.
63. Leung, “Political Participation of the Catholic Church,” 272-73.
64. S. C. F. Hung, “Political Participation of Students in Hong Kong: A Historical
Account of Transformation,” in New Trends of Political Participation in Hong
Kong, ed. Joseph Y. S. Cheng (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press,
2014), 280-81.
65. Ibid., 281.
66. C. P. Yew and K. M. Kwong, “Hong Kong Identity on the Rise,” Asian Survey
54, no. 6 (2014): 1088-1112.
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Wong wanted to ignite a wave of civil disobedience among Hong
Kong students that built upon years of pent-up frustration. He
told CNN, “I don’t think our battle is going to be very long…. If
you have the mentality that striving for democracy is a long,
drawn-out war and you take it slowly, you will never achieve it.
You have to see every battle as possibly the final battle—only
then will you have the determination to fight.”67
Wong’s motivation comes from his Christian faith, but he
believes that besides bringing the gospel of salvation to the peo-
ple, he has a responsibility to care for the poor, the weak, and the
needy. His vision of democracy spreading from Hong Kong to
mainland China has predisposed many young people to join the
cause. Besides fighting for freedom, he also stands firm in his
identity as a Christian and as a Hongkonger resisting to be treated
just like any other citizen of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
This charismatic young leader and political activist, who was cer-
tainly throwing all his energies into the Umbrella Movement, is a
sign that this will be a continuous fight. At one point he declared
that “time is on my side,” for he was only seventeen years old at
the time of the OCLP/UM.
Conclusion
While OCLP/UM had all the hallmarks of a secular social movement
aimed at political liberalization and democratization, this research
has shown that many of its key initiators were convinced that prog-
ress towards democracy in Hong Kong would be the best way of
protecting religious freedom and a democratic way of life. Since the
OCLP/UM failed to force Chief Executive Leung Chun Ying to step
down and also did not achieve universal suffrage for all Hong Kong
citizens by the year 2017, the research question raised in the intro-
duction still needs to be answered. Did the movement lack the
“ability to articulate the reasons for the demonstrations”68 and
thus have only “the power of its own efforts to sustain it?”69
The answer to the first part of the question is that the three
leaders (Cardinal Zen, Benny Tai, and Joshua Wong) drew heavily
on their Christian faith when making the case for public protests
and civil disobedience. Their visions and missions were the same
in all but strategy. Wong, in particular, may seem to have gone
67. Wilfred Chan and Yuli Yang, “Echoing Tiananmen, 17-year-old Hong Kong
student prepares for democracy battle,” CNN, September 21, 2014, http://edi
tion.cnn.com/2014/09/21/world/asia/hong-kong-joshua-wong-democracy-pro
test/).
68. Williams, “Leaderless Movements are Impossible to Maintain.”
69. Ibid.
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along with the OCLP leaders’ principle of non-violence, but he ac-
tually “hijacked”70 the entire undertaking by frequently escalating
the process without the consensus of the core team, which is per-
haps the main reason why OCLP/UM became polarized and frag-
mented. Wong believed that students should be on the frontline
because, unlike adults, who like to talk about political facts and
the broader context, they would refuse to compromise before
achieving their goal. For him, the present was the time to succeed,
whereas Zen and Tai saw the OCLP as a stepping-stone towards
further engagement in the future. Zen and Tai agreed that they
should learn how to guide this group of young activists properly,
but behind them was the figure of Martin Lee, who greatly encour-
aged the students’ growing radicalism. During Nancy Ng’s inter-
view, Zen spoke of Lee’s involvement with the student leaders and
his advice that they adopt a more confrontational approach. Per-
haps Lee indirectly helped to catapult Wong into eminence and
groom him into the fearless, charismatic leader who now advan-
ces the cause of democracy in Hong Kong.
To answer the second part of the question, it can be argued that
OCLP/UM indeed only had the power of its own efforts to sustain
its actions. The broader context is that the three protagonists Zen,
Tai, and Wong attempted the impossible: Knowing that Beijing
would never budge, and despite all the difficulties they faced,
they have retained their conviction that what they were doing is
for the common good, not merely for the Christians but for the
whole of Hong Kong. Notwithstanding the consequences, retribu-
tions, and blame they received for causing so much social up-
heaval, they remained convinced of their long-term vision of a
democratic future for Hong Kong. OCLP leader Chan Kin Man has
commented that “many people think we want to paralyze Central,
but all we want is self-sacrifice”—that is, the offering of oneself
up for arrest during acts of non-violent civil disobedience for the
greater good.71
In this essay, we have shown that through the processes of insti-
tutional channeling and political participation, Christianity has
exerted a deep influence over the citizens of Hong Kong. While
the handover in 1997 effectively brought the privileged church-
state relationship to an end, the Catholic Church more generally
and to a lesser extent the Protestant churches have time and again
spoken out in defense of Hong Kong’s social and political values.
Thus, Christianity still has a role to play in Hong Kong’s political
sphere. In the words of Goossaert and Palmer, “[J]ust as
70. Zen, “OCLP 2014 in HK.”
71. Lam, “The Occupy Central Movement,” 456.
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Christians lost their privileged position, some began to advocate
taking a more ‘prophetic’ public role, moving from executor to
critic of government policy.”72 While Victoria Hui is correct in
stating that OCLP/UM was not in and of itself a Christian move-
ment,73 this essay provides ample evidence that high-profile
movement leaders of the Christian faith played a central role dur-
ing OCLP/UM. We concur with J. K. H. Tse that “the Umbrella
Movement can hardly be considered a failure” and that “the gift of
the Umbrella Movement alongside the other cognate protest
movements in the world today is the empirical verification of a
theological paradigm shift. Freire taught us long ago that if we
want to have a truly free and democratic world, the cycle of vio-
lence must give way to the humanization of both the oppressed
and the oppressor.”74 Tse concludes that “[the] Umbrella Move-
ment is not over because the pedagogy of the oppressed is not yet
finished … [the] action has yet to take place.”75 How relevant the
moderating influence of Christian leaders on the movement was
becomes clearer when seen in comparison with the far more mili-
tant post-OCLP/UM skirmishes between protesters and the Hong
Kong police. Daniel Lee has called the political violence of the so-
called Fishball Revolution of February 8-9, 2016, “a dramatic para-
digm shift from social activism rooted in civic values to one that
discards them.”76 In stark contrast it can be said that the church
has joined the chorus of increasingly vocal civic groups and has
also helped broaden public participation by involving both Catho-
lics and Protestants in social movements. Ecumenical initiatives,
such as the 2014 joint declaration of Protestants and Catholics
titled “Confessions of Christians Watching over Hong Kong,”77
are indicative of the willingness and ability of different Christian
denominations to join the same battle line in defense of democ-
racy and freedom of religion. These findings suggest that future
research on Hong Kong’s multi-faceted social and political move-
ments will also need to take the religious dimension into account.
72. Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China, 353.
73. Victoria Hui, “Not a Christian Movement,” Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement
and Beyond, October 1, 2015, https://victoriatbhui.wordpress.com/2015/10/
01/not-a-christian-movement.
74. Tse, “Epilogue: Conscientization in the Aftermath of Occupying Hong Kong,”
171-72.
75. Ibid., 172.
76. Daniel Lee, “A Paradigm Shift in Civil Society: From the Umbrella to the Fish-
ball Revolution,” Hong Kong Free Press, March 18, 2016, https://www.hon
gkongfp.com/2016/03/18/a-paradigm-shift-in-civil-society-from-the-umbrella-
to-the-fishball-revolution/.
77. Chan, “The Protestant Community and the Umbrella Movement,” 388.
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